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Abstract
This paper investigates the choice of the composition of govern-
ment expenditure using both positive and normative approaches. The
former involves aggregation over selfish voters (simple majority vot-
ing and stochastic voting are examined), while the latter involves the
choice by a single disinterested individual (considered to maximise a
social welfare function). The approach allows direct comparisons of
the choice mechanisms. The structures examined include a transfer
payment combined with a pure public good, and a transfer payment
with tax-financed education. Explicit solutions are obtained for the
choice of expenditure components, and these are shown to depend
on the proportional difference between the arithmetic mean and an-
other measure of location of incomes, where the latter depends on the
choice mechanism. In each case the expenditure composition depends
on an inequality measure defined in terms of the proportional differ-
ence between a measure of location of the income distribution and the
arithmetic mean, where the location measure depends on the decision
mechanism.
JEL Categories: D78; H41; H53
Keywords: Government expenditure; Majority voting; Stochastic
voting; Public goods; Social welfare
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versity, Australia.
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1 Introduction
This paper investigates the choice of the composition of government expen-
diture using both positive and normative approaches. The former involves
aggregation over selfish voters: simple majority voting and stochastic voting
are examined. The latter involves the choice by a single disinterested individ-
ual who is considered to maximise a social welfare function. Special attention
is given to the relationship between the composition of expenditure and in-
equality. This allows consideration of the question of the extent to which
higher inequality produces a choice in favour of a higher proportion of ex-
penditure being devoted to equalising transfer payments. The approach pro-
vides a synthesis which allows direct comparisons of the choice mechanisms.
In each model, the expenditure composition is found to depend on income
inequality, defined in terms of the proportional difference between arithmetic
mean income and another measure of location of the income distribution.
The precise location measure depends on the particular choice mechanism
investigated. It is useful to explore alternative modelling approaches in view
of the substantial variations in the composition of government expenditure
across countries.
The present analysis looks at the division between a transfer payment
and a pure public good, and the division between a transfer payment and
tax-financed education.1 In addition, concentration is on the case where (as
in most of the optimal tax literature) there is heterogeneity only with respect
to abilities. Individuals are therefore assumed to have similar tastes. In view
of the emphasis on comparing alternative choice mechanisms, for simplic-
ity incomes are assumed to be fixed. The introduction of education clearly
involves a different kind of trade-off. A higher transfer payment involves
less education spending and reduces incomes, thereby affecting individuals’
budget constraints (in addition to the change in the transfer). In the case
where there is only a public good, lower public good expenditure feeds into
1Expenditure on education is classified as a publicly provided private good in Bearse et
al. (2001), Borck (2008) and Soares (2006). In these studies education is provided publicly
but individuals can choose to use this or pay for private education at the market price.
Publicly provided goods are financed by a proportional income tax.
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individuals’ utility functions directly. The synthesis is shown to carry over to
the more complex choice problem. Comparisons between expenditure shares
and inequality, and among choice mechanisms, are not significantly affected.
However, when looking at the relationship between the transfer payment and
the given tax rate, it is simply necessary to keep in mind that incentive effects
are likely to produce a concave schedule.
Relatively few studies have concentrated on the composition of expen-
diture. The political economy literature has instead given more attention
to the total government size or tax rate. Most studies focus on one type
of government expenditure, either public goods expenditure or a redistrib-
utive transfer payments and consider voting on the tax rate. For example,
Meltzer and Richard (1981) Krusell and Rios-Rull (1999), and Borck (2007)
considered redistributive expenditure and Tridimas (2001) and Tridimas and
Winer (2005) look at expenditure on public goods. However, Bearse et al.
(2001) examined majority voting over a transfer payment and public educa-
tion, conditional on the tax rate, in a static framework. Creedy and Moslehi
(2009) examined majority voting over government expenditure on transfer
payments as well as public goods, with endogenous incomes, again within a
static framework.
This paper follows the second line of approach and concentrates on the
composition of government expenditure for a given tax. The income tax rate
is assumed, as in Bearse et al. (2001) and Creedy and Moslehi (2009), to
be exogenously fixed and thus determined by a separate process. It may
be thought of as determined by some conventional view regarding ‘taxable
capacity’, or other constraints are imposed on governments regarding the
rate. In practice, taxing and expenditure policies are indeed debated inde-
pendently.2
Most earlier studies concentrated on majority voting outcomes, where
only the median voter is decisive. However, more recent studies have ex-
amined stochastic voting involving the maximisation of a political support
function, and where the mean, variance and skewness are relevant in de-
2In some cases, a two-stage procedure may be envisaged in which voting over the tax
rate is separate from that over the composition.
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termining voting outcomes. Furthermore, multidimensional voting can be
considered. Examples include Tridimas and Winer (2005) where individuals
vote on tax rates and public goods. Tridimas (2001) considered different
categories of expenditure, or public goods, and used probabilistic voting to
study the allocation of public consumption. In addition, Hassler and et al.
(2005) applied probabilistic voting in the context of overlapping generations
with transfer payments and found that the voting outcome for redistribution
is larger and more persistent than the social planner’s choice with commit-
ment. Dolmas (2009) applied probabilistic voting in a simple growth model
with tax on consumption, labour and capital income, as well as a lump-sum
transfer and exogenous government expenditure.
Section 2 considers the allocation of expenditure between transfer pay-
ments and a public good. A majority voting equilibrium is shown to exist
and the ratio of expenditure levels is found to depend on the median voter’s
income as a ratio of arithmetic mean income. The stochastic voting case
is then considered. These results are compared with results obtained us-
ing a general form of social welfare function. Section 3 combines a transfer
payment with tax-financed public education expenditure instead of a public
good. Brief conclusions are in Section 4.
2 Choice of Public Goods and Transfer Pay-
ment
This section examines choices regarding a transfer payment, b, and consump-
tion of a public good, Q, under the alternative decision mechanisms. First,
the specification of individuals’ preferences, and the government budget con-
straint is described. This applies to all mechanisms. Consider person i’s
preferences for private consumption, ci, (where the consumer price index is
normalised to unity) and consumption of a public good, Q, which is non-rival
and non-excludable. Suppose i’s preferences are described by the general di-
rect utility function:
Ui = U (ci, Q) (1)
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All individuals pay a proportional income tax, at the rate τ . As the pure
public good is non-excludable, the individual’s budget constraint is:
ci = yi (1− τ) + b (2)
In this framework, where incomes are fixed, consumption is given simply by
(2).
The public good is produced with a constant unit production cost of
P . The total cost is recovered through the tax system, in view of its non-
excludable nature, with a ‘tax price’ per person of PQ/N , where N is the
population size. The latter thus may be thought to affect outcomes, as
a higher population means that the cost is shared among more people. It
seems useful to restrict attention to utility functions which avoid expenditure
shares (rather than total amounts) depending on N .3 This avoids outcomes
involving a movement entirely to public good expenditure as N increases. It
can be shown that the use of homothetic utility functions where, in addition,
the marginal rate of substitution is a linear function of the ratio of quantities
consumed, satisfies this requirement.4 The following analysis thus uses the
form:5
Ui = ciQ
γ (3)
which clearly has the desired properties mentioned above.
The government budget constraint requires the revenue from income tax-
ation to be equal to the sum of expenditure on transfer payments and public
good. Thus:
τ y¯ = b+
PQ
N
(4)
3Hindriks and Myles (2006) examine a number of models involving the choice of a non-
rival public good, in each of which population size, N , appears as a determinant. However,
they do not discuss the implications of large N . Some authors have argued that population
heterogeneity is increased as population size increases, which has quite different effects:
see Shelton (2007, pp 2234—2235) for more discussion and a review of the literature.
4The need for the ratio of marginal utilities of private to public goods to depend linearly
on QG/ci restricts attention to special case of the more general ‘linear preference system’
of Allen and Bowley (1935).
5This is of course a simple monotonic transformation of the standard Cobb-Douglas
form. For example if U = xαy1−α, taking the αth root gives xy(1−α)/α.
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2.1 Voting Mechanisms
2.1.1 Majority Voting
In examining majority choice, the approach involves obtaining individuals’
indirect utility functions in terms of one policy variable, using the government
budget constraint to eliminate the other. Voting is therefore one-dimensional
and a check can be made for single-peakedness, which guarantees a voting
equilibrium. If this exists, the solution for the majority voting outcome is
found by maximising the median voter’s indirect utility with respect to the
policy variable.
Substituting ci from (2) and b from (4) into the direct utility function
gives indirect utility, Vi, in terms of Q:
Vi =
{
yi (1− τ) + τ y¯ −
PQ
N
}
Qγ (5)
Since ∂2Vi/∂Q
2 < 0, preferences regarding Q, for given τ , are single-peaked.
Hence majority voting is determined by the choice, Qm, of the median voter,
who has yi = ym. Both bm and Qm must be positive, so that 0 < Qm < τy¯.
Maximising Vm with respect to Qm and some rearrangement gives:
PQm
N
=
γ
(1 + γ)
y¯
{
τ +
ym
y¯
(1− τ)
}
(6)
Clearly a relatively low value of γ, the weight attached to consumption of
the private good in utility functions, implies a relatively low choice of public
goods.6 As income distributions are positively skewed, ym/y¯ is less than
one. Also, with higher equality, or higher ym/y¯, majority voting results in
higher expenditure on pubic goods. Since raising the tax rate increase the
government per capita expenditure on public goods. The majority choice of
expenditure on transfer payments, using the government budget constraint,
becomes:
bm =
1
(1 + γ)
y¯
{
τ − γ (1− τ )
ym
y¯
}
(7)
Higher basic inequality leads to a more redistributive expenditure policy,
for given τ . Indeed the ratio bm/y¯ falls linearly as ym/y¯ increases, from
6In the trivial case where γ = 0, and voters obtain no utility from the public good, this
reduces to the simple form bm = τ y¯.
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τ/ (1 + γ) when ym/y¯ = 0 to (τ − γ (1− τ )) / (1 + γ) when ym/y¯ = 1. Fur-
thermore, bm/y¯ increases linearly as τ increases, from bm/y¯ = 0 when τ =
{1 + (1/ (γym/y¯))}
−1 to (1− (γym/y¯)) / (1 + γ) when τ = 1. The ratio,
Rm = bm/ (PQm/N), is given by:
Rm =
1
γ
τ − ym
y¯
(1− τ)
τ + ym
y¯
(1− τ)
(8)
The majority choice of the composition of expenditure, for given τ , thus
depends on the taste parameter γ and the median income relative to the
arithmetic mean. The ratio is independent of the units of measurement of
incomes and of the population size. Differentiation of Rm with respect to
ym/y¯ gives (∂Rm/∂ (ym/y¯)) < 0. Hence a reduction in ym/y¯, that is an in-
crease in inequality, produces a higher proportion of expenditure devoted to
the redistributive transfer payment.7 Also, ∂2Rm/∂ (ym/y¯)
2 > 0 which im-
plies that the ratio of transfer payment expenditure to public goods increases
at an increasing rate as inequality rises. Furthermore, it can be shown that
Rm increases with τ at a decreasing rate but, because incentive effects are
neglected here, it does not turn downwards.8 Also, there is a negative re-
lationship between the weight attached to public goods, γ, and the ratio of
expenditure on transfer payment to public goods.
It is possible to define a set of income inequality measures, IL = 1−yL/y¯,
where yL is some measure of location. Hence the majority voting outcome is
a function of inequality, Im = 1 − ym/y¯, although the median voter, acting
entirely selfishly, has no desire to reduce inequality except insofar as the
median person gains from redistribution.
A negative relationship between inequality and government size, or the
tax rate, is a core result in the theoretical literature inspired by Romer (1975)
7This result is consistent with Creedy and Moslehi (2009) which concentrates on trans-
fer payment and public goods for a given tax with endogenous labour supply. In addition,
see Meltzer and Richard (1981) and Romer (1975), who examined majority voting over
the tax rate, with an unconditional transfer payment. There is considerable literature
associated with these studies. However, empirical evidence concerning this relationship,
based on cross-sectional data for a range of countries, has been found to be mixed: see
Lind (2005).
8Thust ∂2Rm/∂τ
2 < 0 and when τ = 1, ∂Rm/∂τ = ym/γy¯.
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and Meltzer and Richard (1981). However, empirical studies are mixed and
Lind (2005) discussed some different reasons for these mixed result.9 Alesina
and Glaeser (2004) suggested that differences in the composition of govern-
ment expenditure cannot be explained by economic theories in which higher
inequality leads to higher redistribution. Instead, they suggested (2004,
p.220) that there are different attitudes toward redistribution, based partly
on views regarding income mobility. In the present context such differences
in expenditure patterns can in fact be consistent with inequality differences,
if there are different preferences for public and private goods across coun-
tries. Furthermore, increasing ym/y¯ reduces Rm at a decreasing rate for all
tax rates and preference parameters. Numerical results (not reported here)
show that, over the most relevant range of ym/y¯, the response of the expen-
diture ratio to a change in inequality is expected to be relatively small. This
may be another reason why empirical studies obtain mixed results.
2.1.2 Stochastic Voting
This section considers stochastic voting instead of the simple majority voting
mechanism discussed above. Suppose the population consists of K groups of
individuals, where group k has population proportion nk, for k = 1, ..., K,
so that
∑K
k=1 nk = 1. Within each group individuals have the same income,
so that if there are two political parties, A and B, with associated policies,
individuals within each group have the same indirect utility except for a
stochastic element. Voter i in group k prefers party A if:
Vk,A > Vk,B + si,k + g (9)
The term si,k represents member i of group k’s additive bias towards party
B, and for the kth group si,k lies between −s
∗
k and +s
∗
k.
10 This bias is
9These include the existence of multiple social contracts, prospect of upward income
mobility, multi-dimensional policies, race and redistribution versus social insurance.
10An alternative specification of bias in which the additive form in (9) is replaced by a
multiplicative form, whereby what matters are the relative sizes of Vk,A and Vk,B rather
than the absolute sizes, leads to a formulation which is additive in the logarithms. The
objective function is thus expressed as a weighted geometric mean of indirect utilities,
rather than a weighted arithmetic mean, such that S =
∑
i ηi logVi. The voting outcomes
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considered to arise from factors which are not related to the policies of the
parties. In addition g represents a population-wide additive bias towards
party B. The si,k are random variables, along with g, with expected values of
zero. The introduction of random components involves a substantial change
to the voting framework, compared with the deterministic model in which
the probability of an individual voting for party A switches from 0 to 1, as
Vk,A switches from being less than, to greater than, Vk,B.
Following Persson and Tabellini (2000), the situation facing party B is
symmetric with that of A and, where each party is assumed to be trying to
maximise its chances of winning the election, the policies of the two parties
converge. They can be regarding as having the objective function:
S =
K∑
k=1
ηkVk (10)
where of course Vk is regarded as a function of policy variables. and ηk is
nk/s
∗
k.
This framework does not place any restriction on the number of policy in-
struments under consideration. Hence there are no problems of the existence
of a voting equilibrium, such as those which can arise with deterministic vot-
ing. However, two conditions need to hold in the stochastic voting model.
First, voters’ utilities should be concave functions of political platforms. Sec-
ond, the density of ideologies should not be a sharply increasing function: in
the present model the distribution of si,k is uniform, which satisfies this con-
dition.11
This approach can thus be applied to the present context of the division
of expenditure between transfers and a public good, as follows. Each party
maximises the support function, the expected vote in (10), subject to the
government budget constraint. Indirect utility for an individual in group k
is considerably sensitive to the form specification of bias. Dolmas (2009) looks at equi-
librium of taxes in a probabilistic voting model. He finds that the assumption about the
form, additive or multiplicative, of random non-policy element affects considerably the
equilibrium of taxes. Here, only the additive form of bias is examined.
11See Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, p. 365) for more details about the conditions
required for probabilistic voting.
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takes the form {yk (1− τ) + b}Q
γ . The first-order conditions with respect
to transfer payments and public goods are as follows:
K∑
k=1
ηkQ
γ
S = λ (11)
K∑
k=1
ηkγ {yk (1− τ) + bS}Q
γ
S = λ
pQS
N
(12)
where λ is the relevant Lagrange multiplier. Also, pQS/N and bS are the
per capita expenditure on public goods and transfer payments under sto-
chastic voting. The above first-order conditions with the government budget
constraint give:
pQS
N
=
γy¯
(1 + γ)
{
τ + (1− τ)
˜˜y
y¯
}
(13)
bS =
y¯
(1 + γ)
{
τ − γ (1− τ )
˜˜y
y¯
}
(14)
Where ˜˜y =
∑K
k=1 yk
(
ηk/
∑K
k=1 ηk
)
and is a weighted average income. The
weights, ηk/
∑K
k=1 ηk, are a function of political influence, ηk. Recall that
ηk = nk/s
∗
k which shows that the group size, nk, as well as the group density,
s∗k, affect the weighted average income under stochastic voting. The latter
shows the sensitivity of the voters in each group to the economic policies.
The ratio of expenditure on transfer payments to public goods with sto-
chastic voting, RS, therefore becomes:
RS =
1
γ
τ − (1− τ)
˜˜y
y¯
τ + (1− τ)
˜˜y
y¯
(15)
Comparing the stochastic voting results with the median voter’s choice of
public goods and transfer payment indicates that the two expressions are
identical except for the fact that the majority choice depends on ym/y¯ whereas
stochastic voting depends on ˜˜y/y¯. In the median voter framework only the
median individual is the decisive voter and the relative position of the median
to the arithmetic mean plays the crucial role. With probabilistic voting, the
10
group size plays an important role, but also the responsiveness of voters in
each group affects the outcome.
Comparative statics results with respect to τ and γ are similar to the
majority voting case. In addition, bS and pQS/N are linearly decreasing and
increasing in ˜˜y/y¯ , respectively. Moreover, there is a negative relationship
between ˜˜y/y¯ and the ratio of expenditure on transfer payments to public
goods. The weight of different groups in the political support function, ηk, is
one of the main determinates of the composition of government expenditure
and the derivatives of per capita expenditure on transfer payments and public
goods with respect to ηk are given by:
∂ (pQS/N)
∂ηk
=
γ (1− τ )
(1 + γ)
(
yk − ˜˜y
)∑K
k=1 ηk
(16)
∂b
∂ηk
= −
γ (1− τ)
(1 + γ)
(
yk − ˜˜y
)∑K
k=1 ηk
(17)
Suppose income in group k is lower than the weighted average income, ˜˜y.
Consequently, voters in this group support less expenditure on public goods
and more expenditure on transfer payments. For instance, suppose there are
three groups of individuals: poor, middle-income and rich. If the political
influence of the group of poor falls, the expenditure on transfer payments
decreases relative to public goods. The political influence of the poor can
fall by reducing the share of poor in the whole population or increasing the
responsiveness of voters in the group of poor to changes in the economic
policy.
2.2 A Social Welfare Function
This subsection examines the policy decision regarding the composition of
expenditure where choices are made by an independent judge, whose value
judgements are summarised by a social welfare function, W , defined as a
function of indirect utilities. Hence:
W =W (V1, ..., VN) (18)
which is assumed to be concave with respect to b andQ. This implies that the
associated social indifference curves, giving combinations of Q and b which
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leave W unchanged, are convex. An optimal allocation of expenditure is
obtained as a point of tangency of the highest social indifference curve which
can be reached subject to the government’s budget constraint relating Q and
b. The optimal policy is thus given from the condition:
db
dQ
∣∣∣∣
τ
=
db
dQ
∣∣∣∣
W
(19)
Differentiating W totally with respect to public good expenditure and the
transfer payment gives:
dW =
(
N∑
i=1
∂W
∂Vi
∂Vi
∂b
)
db+
(
N∑
i=1
∂W
∂Vi
∂Vi
∂Q
)
dQ (20)
Consider social indifference curves relating combinations of Q and b for which
W is constant. Setting dW = 0 gives the slope of indifference curves, db
dQ
∣∣∣
W
,
as:
db
dQ
∣∣∣∣
W
= −
N∑
i=1
∂W
∂Vi
∂Vi
∂QG
N∑
i=1
∂W
∂Vi
∂Vi
∂b
(21)
This slope can be expressed more conveniently by defining vi as the welfare
weight attached to an increase in i’s income; that is:
vi =
∂W
∂Vi
∂Vi
∂b
(22)
and:
N∑
i=1
∂W
∂Vi
∂Vi
∂Q
=
N∑
i=1
vi
(
∂Vi/∂Q
∂Vi/∂b
)
(23)
Substituting (22) and (23) into (21) gives:
db
dQ
∣∣∣∣
W
= −
N∑
i=1
v′i
(
∂Vi/∂Q
∂Vi/∂b
)
(24)
with v′i = vi/
∑N
i=1 vi. The slope of social indifference curves is therefore a
weighted sum of the ratio of ∂Vi/∂QG to ∂Vi/∂b.
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Hence differentiating Vi = {yi (1− τ ) + b}Q
γ gives the result that ∂Vi/∂Q =
γVi/Q and ∂Vi/∂b = Q
γ . Appropriate substitution, and writing y˜ =
∑N
i v
′
iyi,
gives:
db
dQ
∣∣∣∣
W
= −
γ
Q
{y˜ (1− τ) + b} (25)
The government budget constraint in this model takes the simple linear form
in (4). Hence:
db
dQ
∣∣∣∣
τ
= −
P
N
(26)
Equating slopes, and using PQ/N = τ y¯ − b, gives the optimal transfer, bW ,
as the solution to:
bW =
y¯
(1 + γ)
{
τ − γ (1− τ )
y˜
y¯
}
(27)
This takes the same basic form as equation (7), except that bm is replaced
by bW and the median income, ym, is replaced by the welfare-weighted aver-
age, y˜: the corresponding inequality measure is thus IW = 1 − y˜/y¯. Hence
the optimal transfer compares with the solution given in (6) above and the
expression for the expenditure ratio takes the same basic form as in equation
(8).
However, (27) is actually far from straightforward in view of the com-
plexity of the welfare weights, v′i, even for simple forms of the social welfare
function. Equation (27) does not in fact provide a closed-form solution for bW .
As in standard optimal tax analyses, the solution to the nonlinear equation
(27) can be obtained numerically using a simulated distribution of incomes
and searching for the value of b which gives the highest W , while making use
of the government budget constraint.
It would clearly be convenient if y˜ could be replaced by a term that did not
itself depend on the optimal value of b, thereby providing an approximation to
the optimal value which could easily be expressed (and, if desired, calculated)
using (27). This would facilitate analysis of the comparative-static properties
of the model. This problem is examined further in the appendix, which
considers the widely used form of social welfare function:
W =
N∑
i=1
V 1−εi
1− ε
(28)
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for ε > 0 and ε = 1.12 It is shown that a good approximation can be obtained
in which the weighted income y˜ is replaced by the equally-distributed equiv-
alent income, yede: this is the income which, if equally distributed, gives the
same social welfare as the actual distribution, for a welfare function defined
in terms of incomes and taking the same iso-elastic form as above (but with yi
replacing Vi). Thus ∂W/∂yi = y
−ε
i and ε measures the absolute value of the
elasticity of marginal valuation. In this context ε reflects relative inequality
aversion, and IW is approximated by the Atkinson (1970) inequality mea-
sure. Hence optimal values can be examined without the need for simulation
analyses of the kind described above, by replacing y˜ in the above expression
by its approximation, y˜A, where y˜A = yede.
Furthermore, if the distribution of income is lognormal it is shown in the
appendix that the following relationship holds:
yede
y¯
=
(
ym
y¯
)ε
(29)
The optimal expenditure levels and their ratio can thus be expressed in terms
of ym/y¯, just as in the majority voting framework, except that there is an
additional degree of nonlinearity in the expressions, involving the term ε.
The majority voting outcome and the social welfare maximising outcome
are approximately the same in the special case where ε = 1. These results
suggest that it may be difficult empirically to discriminate between majority
voting and optimal allocation frameworks.
One property of the model is that the chosen value of the transfer pay-
ment increases with the given tax rate. As a result, the ratio, R, increases
continually with τ . However, this arises because labour supply incentive ef-
fects are not modelled. This is the major result that is likely to be modified
when allowance is made for incentive effects of taxation. An increase in τ
has, in addition to a ‘tax rate effect’ which causes revenue to increase, a
‘tax base effect’ whereby total income falls. At some point the second effect
dominates and total revenue falls as τ increases at higher levels. The profiles
of b and of R against τ are thus likely eventually to turn downwards at some
12For ε = 1, the term V 1−εi / (1− ε) is replaced by log Vi.
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stage.13
Returning to the objective, in (10), which applies in the case of stochastic
voting, this has in some respects the appearance of a social welfare function
expressed as a weighted sum (or weighted arithmetic mean) of indirect utili-
ties. This is a form of utilitarian welfare function, except that the weights do
not depend on value judgements of the decision-maker or judge whose views
are represented by the social welfare function. The weights are determined
by the bias characteristics of the different income groups. A special case of
(10) arises if all s∗k = s
∗ for all k, in which case the objective function to
be maximised is exactly the same as the ‘classical utilitarian’ social welfare
function.14 Hence stochastic voting results take similar forms to the utili-
tarian choices, except that y˜ is replaced by ˜˜y. Basically, y˜ and ˜˜y are just
different weighted average incomes. The weight in the stochastic voting de-
pends on the group size and the group densities whereas the weight in the
social welfare case depends on the value judgment of the decision-maker.15
3 Choice of Education and Transfer Payment
Instead of the choice of allocation of tax revenue between a transfer payment
and a tax-financed non-rival public good, suppose it is required to choose
the combination of a redistributive transfer payment, b, and a quantity of
tax-financed public education per person, E. The same amount of educa-
tion is received by each individual, considered to be a private rather than a
public good. This involves total spending on education of NpE, where p is
13This is confirmed by Creedy and Moslehi (2009) in a cross-sectional study of 24 de-
mocratic countries.
14The utilitarian form has also been rationalised in terms of a social contract among
individuals making a type of ‘constitutional choice’ behind a veil of ignorance, in which
all outcomes are treated as being equally likely. This argument was first stated by Edge-
worth. A social contract arising from extreme risk aversion leads to the Rawlsian maxi-min
evaluation function.
15In the case of no bias, where ηk = 1, comparison shows that the voting equilibrium
coincides with ε = 0; that is, it is the same as the optimal allocation resulting from
a ‘classical utilitarian’ welfare function where only the sum of utilities matters. More
generally, covariances are required, which means that further structure needs to be added
to the model regarding the joint distribution of η and y.
15
the cost per unit of education. The role of education is to increase human
capital, reflected in a higher pre-tax income of each individual. The following
subsections consider alternative choice mechanisms in turn.
The present approach contrasts with Bearse et al. (2001) who examine
transfers and public education, both of which are financed by a proportional
income tax, and voting is on the composition of government expenditure for
a given tax rate. However, individuals decide whether to use the publicly
provided education or buy private education, which leads to double-peaked
preferences where the single crossing condition can be violated.16
For simplicity, suppose there is no externality of the kind where the ed-
ucation of one person enhances the productivity of other individuals (for
example, where teamwork is involved). Nevertheless there is an important
effect arising via the tax structure because education raises the tax base. The
assumption used in previous sections regarding incentives is retained, namely
that labour supplies and hence pre-tax incomes are not influenced by the tax
and transfer system. Nevertheless yi is endogenous as it is influenced by the
choice of E. It is determined via the following Cobb-Douglas human capital
production function:
yi = δy
θ
0,iE
1−θ (30)
where y0,i is i’s ‘base’ value of income. Rearrangement of (30) gives:
yi
y0,i
− 1 = δ
(
E
y0,i
)1−θ
− 1 (31)
which implies that equal education spending per person produces a propor-
tional increase in income above the base value that is higher for lower-income
individuals. In this simple model, education is therefore equalising, though
in a different manner from that of the transfer payment. Furthermore, the
transfer payment has no effect on the tax base, unlike education expenditure.
16Borck (2008) uses a similar framework to study voters’ preferences for centralised
versus local public education. Numerical simulations show the group of rich and poor
prefer centralisation and the middle class prefers local education. Soares (2006) extends
the political economy model of public funded education by using the general equilibrium
overlapping generation model with altruism.
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The government’s budget constraint is:
b+ pE = τ y¯ (32)
where y¯ is arithmetic mean income, given by:
y¯ =
1
N
∑
yi = δE
1−θ
(
1
N
∑
yθ0,i
)
(33)
It is convenient to write y¯0,θ =
(
1
N
∑
yθ0,i
)1/θ
. Although this notation involves
the use of a bar above the variable, y, the θ subscript in y¯0,θ indicates that
it is a generalised mean rather than an arithmetic mean.17 Hence:
y¯ = δE1−θy¯θ0,θ (34)
Substituting into the budget constraint (32) gives:
b = τδE1−θy¯θ0,θ − pE (35)
Assume that individuals obtain no direct consumption benefits from ed-
ucation. Hence, it is appropriate simply to consider their net income, or
consumption, as the maximand. Hence individuals are concerned with:
ci = yi(1− τ) + b (36)
3.1 Voting Mechanisms
3.1.1 Majority Voting
Consider first the choice of expenditure policy by majority voting. Substi-
tuting for b from (35) into (36), consumption can be expressed in terms of
E, whereby:
ci = δE
1−θ
{
yθ0,i(1− τ ) + τ y¯
θ
0,θ
}
− pE (37)
It can be seen that ∂2ci/∂E
2 < 0, confirming that preferences regarding E
are single peaked. Therefore the per capita majority choice of expenditure
17The generalised mean also contrasts with the ‘moment of order θ about the origin’
which is 1N
∑
yθ0,i. Hence the units of the generalised mean correspond to those of the
original variable, y0,i.
17
on education, pEm, is determined by the preferences of the median voter,
with y0,m. Setting ∂cm/∂Em = 0 and solving for Em gives:
18
pEm = (PE)
1− 1
θ y¯0,θ {δ (1− θ)}
1
θ
{
τ + (1− τ)
(
y0,m
y¯0,θ
)θ} 1θ
(38)
Thus, using government budget constraint:
bm =
(
τδy¯θ0,θE
−θ
m − p
)
Em (39)
The majority choice of the ratio of the transfer payment to education expen-
diture, Rm, is:
Rm =
1
1− θ
{
1 +
(
1
τ
− 1
)(
y0,m
y¯0,θ
)θ}−1
− 1 (40)
and is independent of δ and p. It can be shown that ∂Rm/∂τ > 0, implying
that expenditure on transfers increases relative to education, though this
result is likely to be different when incentive effects are modelled.
Differentiation of Rm with respect to θ gives
∂Rm
∂θ
> 0. Hence a rise in
θ produces a higher proportion of expenditure devoted to the redistributive
transfer payment. Higher θ implies that education is less effective in increas-
ing the average level of productivity, so voters vote on lower education and
higher transfer payment.
3.1.2 Stochastic Voting
As before, suppose the population is divided toK groups, with the proportion
in each group of nk, so that
∑K
k=1 nk = 1. Each party maximises the number
of votes and the policies of the two parties converge. The support function
is:
S =
K∑
k=1
ηkVk (41)
18If Ui = c
α
i is considered instead of simply maximising ci, indirect utility, Vi, can be
written in terms of QE using (36) and the first-order condition for i’s most preferred value
of QE is
∂Vi
∂QE
= αVici
∂ci
∂QE
= 0. The trivial solution where Vi = 0 can be ignored, and the
condition for a maximum is, as above, ∂ci∂QE = 0.
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where ηk is nk/s
∗
k and Vk is the indirect utility of group k, regarded as a
function of policy variables, and is:
Vk = δy
θ
0,kE
1−θ(1− τ ) + b (42)
The probabilistic voting outcomes are obtained by maximizing the support
function subject to the government budget constraint. Therefore:
pES = (p)
1− 1
θ y¯0,θ {δ (1− θ)}
1
θ
{
τ + (1− τ )
∑K
k=1 ηky
θ
0,k
y¯θ0,θ
∑K
k=1 ηk
} 1
θ
(43)
bS =
(
τδy¯θ0,θE
−θ
S − p
)
ES (44)
Where pES and bS are per capita expenditure on public goods and trans-
fer payments at stochastic voting. Also, ηk is equal to nk/s
∗
k and shows
the political influence of the group k. In this case yθ0,m is replaced by∑K
k=1 ηky
θ
0,k/
∑K
k=1 ηk, defined as the weighted generalized mean, where each
weight is a function of the political influence. As before, the general proper-
ties of the alternative mechanisms are similar, but further progress requires
assumptions about the joint distribution of ηk and y0,k, about which a priori
information is difficult to specify.
3.2 A Social Welfare Function
Consider the maximisation of a social welfare function expressed in terms of
the net income of each individual, so that:19
W = W (c1, ..., cN ) (45)
Following the same procedure as discussed in the previous section, but withE
replacing Q, the optimal value corresponds to a tangency solution where the
highest social indifference curve touches the government budget constraint.
The slope of social indifference curves is given by:
db
dE
∣∣∣∣
W
= −
N∑
i=1
v′i
(
∂ci/∂E
∂ci/∂b
)
(46)
19Hence ci replaces Vi in the previous expression for W . The use of, say, Vi = c
α
i makes
no difference to the result.
19
with v′i = vi/
∑N
i=1 vi and vi =
∂W
∂ci
∂ci
∂b
. The slope of the budget constraint is:
db
dE
∣∣∣∣
τ
= (1− θ)τδE−θy¯θ0,θ − p (47)
It can be shown that substitution for ∂ci/∂E and ∂ci/∂b, and solving for
EW gives the same result as in equation (38), but with y0,m replaced by y˜0,θ,
defined as the weighted generalised mean:
y˜0,θ =
(
N∑
i=1
v′iy
θ
0,i
)1/θ
(48)
Despite the different type of choice problem, the synthesis obtained earlier
carries over. A general property of these types of model is that the expression
giving the solution for optimal values takes the same basic form as that for
majority voting outcomes, with the difference that the median income is
replaced by a welfare-weighted mean income.
Again, the complexities associated with the welfare-weighted term, y˜0,θ,
may be overcome by approximating it using the equally distributed equivalent
value of basic income, y0,i, and assuming lognormality of the distribution of
y0,i: this follows the same approach as set out for the previous model, as
discussed in the appendix.20 The result corresponding to (29) is:21
y˜0,θ
y¯0,θ
=
(
y0,m
y¯0,θ
)ε
(49)
where ε is the degree of relative inequality aversion. Comparison with (40)
shows that θ and ε have a similar effect on the variation in R with y0,m/y¯0,θ,
as the exponent on the latter is the product, θε.
4 Conclusions
This paper has investigated the choice of the composition of government
expenditure in simple static models, in terms of the outcome of voting and the
20In this case, lognormality also implies that in general the equally distributed equiv-
alent, raised to the power, say η, of a variable x is the same as the equally distributed
equivalent of xη. And, as noted in the appendix, the equally distributed equivalent for
aversion of ε is just the generalised mean for a power of 1− ε.
21Furthermore, if the mean and variance of logarithms of the distribution of y0 are µ0
and σ20, then y¯0,θ = exp
(
µ0 +
θσ2
0
2
)
.
20
maximisation of a social welfare function which makes the value judgements
of a disinterested judge explicit. Choices were considered to be conditional on
an exogenously fixed tax rate. The structures examined include a transfer
payment combined with a pure public good, and a transfer payment with
tax-financed education.
It was shown that, in each case, explicit solutions can be obtained for
the majority choice of expenditure components, and these were shown to
depend on a measure of inequality defined in terms of the ratio of the median
to the arithmetic mean pre-tax income. A higher degree of skewness was
found to be associated with a more redistributive expenditure structure (that
is, relatively more revenue being devoted to a universal transfer payment
or basic income). This corresponds to the property of those models which
focus on the determination of the tax rate, rather than the composition of
expenditure, in models having only a redistributive transfer payment. With
stochastic voting, maximisation of a support function was found to have
technical similarities with maximisation of a welfare function, though the
interpretation is very different indeed. The stochastic voting framework has
the advantage, unlike simple majority voting, that it does not rely on single-
peaked preferences.
In the case of maximisation of a social welfare function, the median in-
come of simple majority voting is replaced by a welfare-weighted mean in-
come, with weights depending on the degree of inequality aversion of the
judge. Although this does not provide a closed-form solution, it was shown
that explicit solutions for the expenditure share can be approximated using
an equally distributed income measure in place of the welfare-weighted mean
income. The majority choice was consequently found to be approximately
the same as the optimal choice in the case where the social welfare function
displays constant relative inequality aversion of unity.
When the allocation is between a transfer payment and expenditure on
education, similar results were found to apply when comparing alternative
choice mechanisms, except that instead of the distribution of income, the
relevant distribution was of initial ability.
Despite the simplicity of the models, for example in terms of the spec-
21
ification of the degree of population heterogeneity and tax structure, it is
suggested that they can provide useful insights into the nature of the basic
relationships involved, particularly regarding the relationship between ex-
penditure shares and inequality, and the comparisons between alternative
choice mechanisms which are seen to hinge on different measures of inequal-
ity, all based on the relative difference between arithmetic mean income and
a measure of location.
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Appendix: Approximating Welfare-Weighted
Income
In considering the optimal composition of government expenditure, welfare-
weighted average income, y˜, plays a crucial role. The expressions given for
optimal values do not strictly provide closed-form solutions, so that numerical
solution procedures must be used. This appendix shows that in a wide range
of situations it is possible to use an approximation for y˜ in the case where
the social welfare function takes the form:
W =
1
1− ε
N∑
i=1
V 1−εi ε = 1, ε > 0 (A.1)
The aim is to obtain an approximation which allows the earlier results to be
treated as closed-form solutions and thus to consider more easily their com-
parative static properties. The individual utility functions used in Section
2.2 take the form:
Vi = {yi (1− τ ) + b}Q
γ (A.2)
Hence ∂Vi/∂b = Q
γ and ∂W/∂Vi = V
−ε
i , and:
vi =
∂W
∂Vi
∂Vi
∂b
= {yi (1− τ ) + b}
−εQγ(1−ε) (A.3)
Suppose b is small relative to yi. In this case an approximation for y˜ =∑
yi (vi/
∑
vi), denoted y˜A, is obtained as:
y˜A =
1
N
∑
y1−εi
1
N
∑
y−εi
(A.4)
This can be further simplified using the assumption that income is lognor-
mally distributed as Λ(y|µ, σ2), with mean and variance of logarithms of µ
and σ2 respectively. Using the properties of the lognormal:
y˜A = exp
[
µ+
σ2
2
(1− 2ε)
]
= exp
[
µ+
σ2
2
(1− ε)
]
exp
[
−εσ2
2
]
(A.5)
However, the use of the assumption that b can be neglected in (A.3) attaches
too much weight to the lower incomes, and thus imparts a downward bias
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to the approximation. One approach is thus to ‘correct’ for this bias by
excluding the last term in (A.5). This gives:
y˜A = exp
[
µ+
σ2
2
(1− ε)
]
(A.6)
A feature of this result in (A.6) is that y˜A is closely related to Atkinson’s
(1970) measure of inequality. Let yede denote the ‘equally distributed equiv-
alent’ income, representing the equal income which gives the same welfare as
the actual distribution, using a welfare function of the formW = 1
1−ε
N∑
i=1
y1−εi .
This is the same as the above but with V replaced by y. Thus:
yede =
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
y1−εi
) 1
1−ε
(A.7)
Again using the lognormal properties, the median and mean income are ym =
eµ and y¯ = eµt +σ
2/2. The term y1−ε has mean and variance of logarithms of
(1− ε)µ and (1− ε)2 σ2, so that:
yede = exp
(
(1− ε)µ+ (1− ε)2
σ2
2
) 1
1−ε
= exp
(
µ+ (1− ε)
σ2
2
)
(A.8)
Hence:
y˜A = yede (A.9)
Furthermore:
yede
y¯
=
exp
(
µ+ (1− ε) σ
2
2
)
exp
(
µ+ σ
2
t
2
) = (exp(−σ2
2
))ε
(A.10)
and using the fact that ym = expµ:
yede
y¯
=
(
ym
y¯
)ε
(A.11)
If y˜A is approximated by yede, (A.11) gives the relationship between income
ratios reported in Section 2.2.
To test the value of this approximation, values of the expenditure compo-
nents using the approximation y˜A = yede were compared with those obtained
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using a simulated population of size 15000 drawn at random from a lognor-
mal distribution with µ = 9.0 and σ2 = 0.5, which imply that y¯ = 10405
and ym/y¯ = 0.78. Using the simulated distribution, a range of values of b
were investigated (the value of b was increased by 10 each time). For each
b the government budget constraint was used to obtain Q and the resulting
values were used to calculate each individual’s level of utility. These were
then used to obtain social welfare, using the iso-elastic function with a spec-
ified inequality aversion parameter, ε. Finally, given a large number of W
measures, the maximum was determined, giving the optimal composition. In
order to compare welfare values, the composition obtained from the approxi-
mation was used with the simulated population. Table 1 gives the results for
a range of parameter values for γ and inequality aversion, ε, with τ = 0.35.
Table 1: Optimal Composition of Expenditure: Alternative Solutions
Approximation Simulation
ε b PQ/N R b PQ/N R %∆W
γ = 0.2
0.8 2111.82 1529.77 1.38 2180.1 1461.5 1.49 -0.0049
0.5 2039.95 1601.65 1.27 2090.1 1551.5 1.35 -0.0067
0.2 1962.47 1679.12 1.17 1990.1 1651.5 1.20 -0.0024
γ = 0.5
0.8 582.05 3059.53 0.19 810.1 2831.49 0.29 -0.0546
0.5 438.3 3203.29 0.14 620.1 3021.49 0.21 -0.0710
0.2 283.35 3358.24 0.09 380.1 3261.49 0.12 -0.0243
These results show that the approximation gives values of expenditure
levels and ratios which are close to those obtained using a large simulated
population.22 The percentage differences, shown in the final column of the
table, are in each case found to be small.
22Furthermore, comparisons showed that the use of the equally distributed equivalent
income was superior to that of (A.5).
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